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  1. 6 customer reviews
  2. Emily Fine – Department of English
  3. [PDF] Inner Ramblings: A Journal Popular Colection
  4. Doc Hall's Journal: The Ramblings of a Sportsman [PDF] Online - video dailymotion

First Edition. Signed by author and illustrator. Soiling to the rear cover. Dust Jacket Condition: Vg-. Inscribed by author on title page, small smudge on front end paper, small spot on title page, jacket has 2 small tears at top edge. From: The Oregon Room - Well described books! Phoenix, OR, U.

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Carefully packaged to protect the corners. Seller Inventory C Published by Self Printed, Leesburg, Ohio From: G. Dust Jacket Condition: Good. Dust jacket is worn at edges and corners and a few clean tears, but is complete and has many photo images. Brown cloth exterior with title in red on front.


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Interior is unmarked, tight and clean. Inscribed by author. Published by Eva Guo From: marvin granlund Emeryville, CA, U. About this Item: Eva Guo, First Edition; First Printing. Fine pink paperback Inscribed by Guo on the title page. Published by The Author, New Hampshire Condition: VG. First edition Stated bound in gray cloth with black lettering. A VG X-Library copy. Has a small bookplate and inked reference numbers of front pastedown, remains of c ard pocket on rear pastedown, white painted reference numbers on the spine. Ernest Walker" on front fly. Published by Quiet Waters Publications About this Item: Quiet Waters Publications, Signed by author, Good condition softcover has some mild general reading wear, nice unmarked interior- a solid copy overall.

Published by Leesburg: Author, , Leesburg About this Item: Leesburg: Author, , Leesburg, Condition: VG in Worn Dj. Dust Jacket Included. VG in Worn Dj. Inscribed By Author. Published by Mid Valley Press About this Item: Mid Valley Press, Inscribed and signed by author on half title-page: "Hope you enjoy these ramblings. Scratches to the front cover.

Published by Self-published, Orlando, FL Soft Cover. Clean wraps with sl rubbed edges, unmarked text block. Published by iUniverse, Inc. About this Item: iUniverse, Inc. From: C. Signed and inscribed by author on title page. Non-fiction, essays. Foreword by John F. Nice copy.

6 customer reviews

Carefully packed for shipment to arrive in same condition as quoted in description. Published by Banffshire Journal About this Item: Banffshire Journal, Udated c Banffshire Journal stapled paperback first Edition, signed by author; very good, clean copy; Uk dealer, Immediate dispatch. Seller Inventory Se. She's known as a prominent anti-abortion voice, Politico reports though the panel will reportedly not weigh in on issues like abortion or same-sex marriage. But one comment has already resurfaced. Andelman DavidAndelman July 8, Glendon reportedly felt that the Globe 's reporting created unnecessary hysteria in Boston's Catholic community.

Her comment reportedly still rankles some folks. Tim O'Donnell. Barabak is reporting that Rep. Eric Swalwell D-Calif. NEWS: Eric Swalwell plans to drop out of the presidential race and seek reelection to the House, according to a Capitol Hill source familiar with his intentions. Barabak markzbarabak July 8, Swalwell had previously fueled speculation that he's dropping out of the race after canceling New Hampshire stops at the last minute and announcing a press conference for Monday afternoon, The Hill reports.

This would come three months to the day that Swalwell announced his candidacy for president on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. He participated in the first round of presidential debates last month and in a notable exchange urged former Vice President Joe Biden to "pass the torch" to the next generation.

Swalwell, who has been polling at 1 percent or below, had not yet secured a position in the second round of debates, as FiveThirtyEight noted. Asked in a post-debate interview about his low polling numbers, Swalwell responded that it's still "early" in the race. Amid these reports on Monday, Swalwell replied to a tweet from The Washington Post 's Dave Weigel, which noted that the rules for the third debate would likely result in many candidates not qualifying but that no one is complaining that the rules are rigged against Swalwell, with the "hands up" emoji.

Whatever body of water you decide to call it, it's clear that a torrential downpour and flash floods have turned the nation's capital into something other than land. The downpour flooded streets and Metro stations, and even caused a literal leak in the press room in the basement of the White House. White House is leaking pic. CNBC's Eamon Javers later tweeted to confirm that a vacuum was in placed to soak up the soppy carpet. Yet elsewhere underground, a literal waterfall had forced a Metro train to confine itself to a single track in the Virginia Square station.

This is fine. And DMV-area residents weren't even safe outside of the city, with this father reportedly having to abandon his car in Bethesda, Maryland, and carry his daughters to the curb. This dad had to carry his daughters from rising flood water in Bethesda. Thanks to News4 photographer eyezediting for capturing this moment. Prosecutors on Monday announced sex trafficking charges against financier Jeffrey Epstein, also revealing nude photographs of apparently underage girls were found at his mansion.

Emily Fine – Department of English

Attorney for the Southern District of New York Geoffrey Berman in a press conference on Monday said that after Epstein was taken into custody, federal agents executed a search warrant at his New York mansion, seizing evidence "including nude photographs of what appeared to be underage girls.

Epstein has been charged with sex trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy, with prosecutors saying on Monday he is "alleged to have abused dozens of victims," all of whom were underage and were given "hundreds of dollars in cash" after these alleged encounters. Polanyi, however, did not present a condensed definition of the concept, which partly has led to varying interpretations of his theory. These two different views are said to represent two different epistemological schools, objectivist epistemology and practice-based epistemology respectively The core of this problem goes back to the question concerning the nature of tacit knowledge; what is tacit knowledge, and what kind of epistemology the concept presupposes in its original sense?

These questions are the key to better assess the possibility of explication of tacit knowledge independently of scholarly emphases. Although epistemic problems are not the most central matter of management studies, these questions cannot be completely bypassed if theories concern knowledge conversions or creation of new knowledge. However, this seems to be often the case in KM literature dealing with the concept. According to our understanding, not only the expression providing the definition of the concept but the entire theoretical context signifies the concept to be defined Bunge Hence, the meaning of a concept in a certain theory is dependent on the theory itself Therefore, separating the concept of tacit knowledge from the rest of Polanyis theoretical framework includes the risk of unintentional conceptual change if the original theory is not taken into account.

The theories that stress the importance of making tacit knowledge explicit differ in an epistemological sense from Polanyis theory because Polanyi did not make ontological distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge equivalent to the distinction often presented in KM literature usually claimed to be adopted from Polanyi.

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[PDF] Inner Ramblings: A Journal Popular Colection

Thus, we address the question, what kind of epistemological theory is required for a procedure of explication of tacit knowledge. The theories stressing the importance of making tacit knowledge explicit generally seem to lack this kind of theoretical considerations. We claim that the epistemology that enables the explication of tacit knowledge presumes a combination of two different kinds of epistemologies that are, however, shown in this work to be mutually incompatible.

In this sense the idea of explication of tacit knowledge seems to lack theoretical plausibility. Also, the According to Cook and Brown , the traditional understanding of the nature of knowledge is widely adopted in the literature concerning organizational knowledge. They call this view an epistemology of possession due to its way to treat knowledge as an entity that people can possess; it highlights objectivity of knowledge and therefore privileges explicit knowledge over tacit knowledge.

However, Cook and Brown remark that there is more epistemic work being done in something that humans can do than can be accounted in terms of knowledge that humans possess; knowing is doing. Cook and Brown call this view an epistemology of practice. It stresses that knowledge is essentially about human activity, and furthermore, knowledge is embodied in people. Cook and Browns thinking seems to refer also to subjective aspects of knowing.

Therefore, this view raises new issues from the perspective of knowledge sharing compared to the epistemology of possession. On the contrary, practice-based perspective stresses that knowledge is embedded in practice. This means that knowledge is not seen as an objective entity that can be separated from people. Instead, development of knowledge is seen as an ongoing process that involves the whole body; it is impossible to disembody that kind of knowledge from people into objective form. In table 1 are presented the epistemological core assumptions of these schools according to From the objectivist perspective sharing of explicit knowledge is a trivial procedure because explicit knowledge is considered to be objective.

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Also sharing of tacit knowledge is seen possible when enriched with the presupposition that tacit knowledge can be converted to explicit. Instead, practice-based epistemologies do not generally support the conception of explication of tacit knowledge. Given that our interest is focused in the idea of explication of tacit knowledge, in Despite that the KM field is closely related to the philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that its main interests are not in analysis of the definition of knowledge but in more practical questions such as utility and value of knowledge, and knowledge sharing.

Thus, theory of knowledge in this context seems to stress the form in which knowledge may appear. This perspective is understandable as the main concern is management of knowledge. Therefore, the meaning of the term epistemology in the context of KM is somewhat looser compared to epistemology as a branch of philosophy that addresses issues concerning what knowledge is and what justifies it. Despite the more pragmatic aims of theories of KM, the traditional epistemological problems, should not be left uncoveredat least if the resulting KM models are expected to be theoretically coherent and credible.

Thus, there is no generally accepted consensus about the definition of knowledge. Nevertheless, the classical definition of knowledge is often some kind of basis or at least an important point of reference for any epistemological considerations. Therefore we briefly discuss what the traditional view consists of, and what kind of properties it requires of knowledge. According to the classical definition, knowing something posits that the thing being known must be believed.

In this sense belief is the basic component of knowledge to which the truth and the justification conditions are set To believe something is mentally to represent it as true Graham Hence, belief is a mental state in which a subject holds a proposition to be true.

Doc Hall's Journal: The Ramblings of a Sportsman [PDF] Online - video dailymotion

To represent something mentally as true naturally includes an idea that the knowing subject is conscious of that belief However, the truthfulness does not make the belief knowledge according to the classical view. For example, in the case of a lucky guess it does not seem reasonable to claim that the subject knew how the things were because the subject had no rational explanation for the belief. In this sense it the condition of justification presupposes that knowledge can be expressed in a form of propositional sentence s , because an essential idea behind the condition of justification is that the verification of knowledge should be repeatable, or at least examinable, by anyone.

Indeed, justifiability of knowledge is specifically related to the ability to publicly present evidence supporting a claim Thus, knowledge is supposed to be presentable linguistically. Also, the propositional form of knowledge suggests that no knowing subject is actually required, because a justified, true proposition exists as an ideal object independent of the knower and time We can perceive the existing reality with our senses, but the understanding we form about the world might not be entirely correct.

Thus, objectivist ontology concerns the world and its form of existence. Instead, objectivist epistemology holds that our knowledge concerning the world is objective. Rands philosophical view that a knowing subject can acquire objective knowledge of reality only through reason. Objective knowledge can be formed from a perception in a process of concept formation and reasoning Reality exists as an objective absolutefacts are facts, independent of mans feelings wishes, hopes and fears.

Hence, knowledge is based on rational reasoning that can be executed by anyone Consequently, epistemological objectivism essentially concentrates on the objective nature of reality and on the justification of knowledge. It seems even useless to deal with the question of the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge from the perspective objectivist thinking because, strictly speaking, the notion of inarticulate and vague tacit knowledge is senseless within the objectivist theory of knowledge; the theoretical framework of objectivism simply does not support such a conception.

According to Polanyi epistemological theories of the time had described human knowledge too narrowly because an absolute objectivity was traditionally emphasized as an attainable ideal for knowledge. He claimed that modern science that was based on disjunction of objective and subjective aimed to eliminate passionate and personal human appraisals of theories from science. Polanyi claimed that if all the knowledge were objective, it would be impossible to make scientific discoveries.

Instead, scientific discoveries were often made on the basis of unexplained informed guesses, intuitions and imaginative ideas that reflected some kind of tacit knowledge. From this critique of modern epistemology and philosophy of science raised the concept of personal knowledge. According to Polanyi, all the acts of conscious mind included a personal coefficient; Into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge.

The knower does not simply pick up the meaning of knowledge but actively forms it by integrating his personal appraisals to the thing that is being known. This is exactly opposite approach to epistemological objectivism, which claims that knowledge should be independent of the knower. Polanyis concept of personal knowledge has strongly objective element because it affirms the possibility to establish contact with knower-independent reality Mitchell Thus, in the ontological sense Polanyis theory refers to realism.

The major feature of Polanyis theory is a distinction between two kinds of awareness that are involved in all conscious acts. Focal awareness concerns the object of conscious act represented in the mind, for example a perception of an external object or a propositional belief. Subsidiary awareness refers to the basis on which the focal awareness operates. Processes of subsidiary awareness provide the elements that the focal object consists of.

For example, when we perform a skill, we attend focally to its outcome, while being only aware of the several moves we coordinate to this effect Polanyi The most essential idea of the theory is that while attending to focal awareness a person dwells in subsidiary awareness that contains subsidiary elements, or clues, of the focal target. The resulting visual perception is a matter of focal awareness. We cannot reach clues, calculations and physiological functions that take place in the subsidiary awareness enabling our knowledge of the focal object.

The process has only one direction terminating in the focal awareness. For example, we can shift our focal attention to movements of our eyes a subsidiary element while observing a moving object, but it changes radically our perception; the thing we are now attending to the movements of our eyes is focal and we can understand hardly anything of how it functioned The focal part of knowing corresponds relatively well to the belief in the traditional definition of knowledge; the focal representation is the conscious understanding that the knowing subject forms of the object of knowing, and that the subject might be able to articulate.

However, this focal belief is a result of something more fundamental, not the starting point of the knowledge, as it is in the traditional definition of knowledge. As all knowing is based on tacit elements in Polanyis theory, objective knowing is not possible by definition. However, logical deduction is a process that comes near explicit knowing in the sense that it is based on connecting focal items, namely the premises and the consequent Polanyi The deductive conclusion is attained using operations with fixed mental structures, which minimizes the need of indwelling to subsidiary awareness because the premises are already given Polanyi The most important difference between deduction and knowing based on tacit subsidiaries is that deduction is a reversible process; it is possible to go back mechanically from the consequence to the premises.

However, knowing based on tacit subsidiaries is not similarly reversible. It is not possible to go back from the integrated focus to its subsidiaries Gill Thus, in addition to being capable of stated clearly, explicitness seems to refer also to the possibility to trace the origins of the focal knowledgethe justification would make knowledge more explicit. However, knowledge cannot be exhaustively justified because it is always based on unspecified particulars Polanyi This logic leads to the culmination of Polanyis theory: the rejection of the idea of fully explicit knowledge.

This claim might seem problematic because it questions our ability to e. Polanyi answered this problem by stressing that knowing is a responsible act that claims for universal validity. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true. Therefore even scientific knowledge claims cannot be verified by means of explicit articulation. The confirmation of scientific knowledge claims would require the use of skills and insights, which themselves lie outside of empirical demonstration Gill Instead, knowledge will be tested in reality that all knowing agents can access; knowledge will justify itself in case it is worth it.

On the other hand, reasons that justify our beliefs can be repealed as our understanding of the subject area accumulates. This, indeed, seems to be often the case in science. Their SECI-model describes conversions between tacit and explicit knowledge types. The most essential part of the model is the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit and Bowman However, explication of tacit knowledge seems to logically presume such a classification; the aim, after all, is to convert knowledge existing in a tacit form to more exploitable explicit form. Generally speaking, there hardly is any conversion of one form to another form if two or more different forms are not presupposed.

Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and numbers and shared in the form of data, scientific formulae, specifications, manuals and the like. Thus, explicitness seems to refer to the form in which knowledge is presented. Also, explicit knowledge is assumed to include the correct meaning unchangeable and ready to be received by anyone. This characterization of explicit knowledge clearly sets a strong objective nature to that kind of knowledge and corresponds well the traditional definition of knowledge.

The use of the concept of tacit knowledge in general is very inconsistent depending on author, but according to the usual characterization it refers to expertise or know-how that is difficult to articulate. However, this classification of epistemologies seems somewhat crude in a sense that the idea of vague and non-justified knowledge cannot be accepted easily into the realm of objectivist thinking, in which the strict justification is a fundamental requirement for knowledge.

For example, experts intuitive hunch simply is not knowledge according to objectivist definition because it is not based on rational, objective reasoning. In order to be useful or even understandable a concept must be supported by other concepts within a conceptual system. This is not the case of the concept of tacit knowledge within the objectivist framework. However, the theories concerning explication of tacit knowledge would consider intuition as an instance of tacit knowledge. Therefore, the theories stressing the explication of tacit knowledge are not objectivist.

Rather, they seem to be some kind of extensions of traditional view on knowledge, because according to these theories objective and real explicit knowledge can be created basing on non-specific forms In sum, the theories of explication of tacit knowledge seem to be based on a relatively straightforward distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge.

The notion of explicit knowledge comes from traditional view on knowledge, whereas the notion of tacit knowledge is based on Polanyis theory of knowledge. Since there is no explicit knowledge according to Polanyis theory, and unjustified tacit knowledge seems rather questionable idea from the perspective of traditional theories of knowledge, explication of tacit knowledge requires an epistemological environment that combines The idea of explication of tacit knowledge presupposes that the inarticulate tacit knowledge is first made articulate.

An articulated, explicit form of tacit knowledge can then be shared with other individuals. This idea clearly has a strong objectivist presupposition; as long as tacit knowledge is explicated, it is supposed to be understandable and usable by others as such. It should be noted, however, that while traditional Western epistemology has focused on truthfulness as the essential attribute of knowledge, we highlight the nature of knowledge as justified belief. If this is considered to be a general definition of knowledge, and knowledge is then supposed to have various types, this implies that the definition concerns both types of knowledge; both tacit and explicit knowledge are justified beliefs.

However, the most common feature of definitions of tacit knowledge in the KM literature is the problem of articulation. Also, intuitive knowing is often equated with tacit knowledge in KM literature. It is self-explanatory that an intuition is just an intuition exactly because of the lack of justification; it is a feeling of knowing something without a well-defined explanation. Therefore the requirement of justification supposedly cannot concern tacit knowledge in these theories.

Consequently justified belief may only concern explicit knowledge in the theories that make the distinction between different types of knowledge. This seems to place tacit and explicit knowledge in an unequal position in a way that is contrary to Polanyis thinking; instead of being a fundamental basis of all knowing, tacit knowledge is seen rather as some kind of possible resource for new, real knowledge.

Now, in the case of explication of tacit knowledge it is logically presumed that tacit knowledge functions as a justification of explicit knowledge as it is the only source of this attained knowledge. However, if tacit knowledge itself is at most very weakly justified, can it function as a justification of something else? In sum, the idea of explication of tacit knowledge seems to provide that the attained objective knowledge is based on a weak justification, that is, for example on characterizations of beliefs, hunches and implicit know-how.

In other words, the requirement of objectivity of knowledge is seen to true, but the application of Polanyis thinking leads necessarily to rejection of requirement of rational justification. Hence, the resulting epistemology seems to be a combination of or even objectivist view, on knowledge. The resulting theory of knowledge has to reject some features both from Polanyis theory of knowledge and from the traditional view on knowledge struck through in the upper boxes of the Figure.

The features that the resulting theory of knowledge adopts from these theories are highlighted in the upper boxes of the Figure. Given that the basis of Polanyis theory of knowledge was a critique against the objective ideal of knowledge, it is not surprising that these two views conflict in some crucial points.

This is also why an epistemology that combines features from both of these theories seems to head for some theoretical problems.. In a theoretical level, to attain reliable objective knowledge it should be derived and justified by anyone based on the same criteriathis is the basic idea behind the requirement of justification; people should end up having the same conclusion, which cannot be generally expected if there are no recognizable premises or if the premises vary a lot from individual to individual.

As objectivist epistemology and also Polanyi states, logic and reason are the most straightforward means to attain fully objective knowledge. Objectivist epistemology considers this possible, whereas Polanyi rejects the idea of fully explicit knowledge.

However, neither of these epistemologies, nor the traditional view on knowledge, accepts that objective knowledge can be based on vague justification. However, following their characterization of different knowledge types it seems logically controversial, that strong, certain and stable knowledge is based on fragile, uncertain and unstable knowledge.

If the idea of fully objective knowledge is, however, still adhered, it leads to distortion of the concept of tacit knowledge; its original intension must be modified in order to make it fit the new theoretical environment. Polanyis notion of tacit knowing goes far beyond the idea of tacit knowing defined merely as intuition or context-specific know-how that accumulates as a result of experience. Instead, tacit knowing belongs inextricably in all conscious acts. The predominant conception of tacit knowledge in the KM literature that supports the idea of explication of tacit knowledge seems therefore to be based on simplification of the concept of tacit knowledge.

For example, if, in the past, knowledge about the importance of buying the boss a gift for his or her birthday was tacit, those who possessed this knowledge were at distinct advantage. But if now everyone knows and uses this piece of knowledge, it will no longer serve to differentiate employees, in the boss eyes, and most likely some other asyet tacit knowledge will take its place. As this example points out, tacit knowledge can become explicit. The awareness of certain way of action as in this case is hardly unspecified or subsidiary.

Tacit knowledge in this example, namely the awareness of the importance of buying the boss a gift, seems to be a focal belief justified or not that can be shared if wanted; someone simply knows or believes that buying a gift is important in certain culture. This kind of conception of tacit knowledge has very little to do with and Takeuchi describe externalization the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge by saying that the use of figurative language is a way to articulate intuitions and insights.

From this seems to follow that articulation of intuition is considered to be articulation of tacit knowledge, which pretty much equates tacit knowledge with intuition. However, it is important to make a distinction between the conscious representation of unexplained feeling of knowing something simplified view on tacit knowledge from the meaningful elements that precede and enable the feeling of knowing The sensation of knowing a solution not to speak of its verbal description belongs in Polanyis terms to the focal, not the tacit, part of that act.

Indeed, a relevant question seems to be, where the sensation of knowing does come from. Why is the intuition just that and not something else? An intuition must be based on something because otherwise it would be just a random guess. In Polanyis terms integrated subsidiary knowledge that finally forms the focal sensation remains unexplained in the process. Thus, intuition is an innate sensibility to coherence that cannot be explained with rules or algorithms Polanyi The knowledge on which intuition is based remains tacit. And it is intuition that forms there our surmises and which eventually selects from the material mobilized by the imagination the relevant pieces of evidence and integrates them into the solution of problem.

Therefore, if intuition itself is equated with tacit knowledge, we logically need a third level of knowledge that is even more quintessential than tacit knowledge, namely the instances of meaning that form the intuition. Although intuition indeed is an outstanding manifestation of tacit knowing, tacit knowledge does not seem to become articulated in the process of articulation of the intuition. Instead, intuition seems to only reflect knowers tacit resources more or less the same way that a skilful performance reflects performers skills that also cannot be described in words.